Multiagent Learning: from fundamentals to foundation models

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Many collaborators

























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Special Thanks to





Overview



Background & Motivation

Paradigms

chronicles

Call to arms

Fundamentals period

DeepRL period

Foundation model period

Bringing periods together



Background

- Before the Deep Learning period
- Breadth-first exploration





Background

- Before the Deep Learning period
- Breadth-first exploration

• Depth-first exploration



Motivation - problem setting



We live in a multi-agent world and to be successful in that world, agents will need to *learn* to take into account the agency of others



Motivation - problem setting



We live in a multi-agent world and to be successful in that world, agents will need to *learn* to take into account the agency of others





Motivation - paradigms



"Perhaps a thing is simple if you can describe it fully in several different ways, without immediately knowing that you are describing the same thing" R. Feynman

Motivation - paradigms



DeepMind

A tale, and Call for (more) contributions



Fundamental Period

• Learning equilibrium

• Nash

• Correlated (Greenwald)

• Games in Normal Form (Boutilier & Claus, Hu and Wellman)

• cooperation

- competition
- Markov Games (Littman)
 - grid worlds
- **other paradigms:** swarm intelligence, evo algorithms, Alife



Fundamental Period





	<i>a</i> 0	a1	a2
b0	10	0	k
b1	0	2	0
b2	k	0	10















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 - Correlated (Greenwald)

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special issue AIJ: *If multiagent learning is the answer, what is the question?* Shoham, Powers and Grenager 2007

M. Wellman, R Vohra - Foundations of Multiagent Learning







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188k 288k 388k

AlphaGo







± 2010

Deep RL Period

- Algorithmics at Scale • Old & New ideas

• Equilibrium Learning

- Nash & Correlated
- \circ mElo, α -Rank

• Training & Evaluation

- League
- Population-based

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Observation State Reward World

Old & New Ideas

- Equilibrium Learning
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 - Population-based

± 2018

Foundation Model Period



Eundamonta

A Tasting Menu of MARL Algorithms



Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Independent vs. Cooperative Agents

A Tasting Menu of MARL Algorithms

Foundational Algorithm

Fictitious Play [Brown, 1951]

Independent Q-learning [Tan, 1993]

Double Oracle [McMahan et al., 2003]

Hysteretic Q-learning [Matignon et al., 2007]

Extended Replicator Dynamics [Tuyls et al., 2003]

Lenient Learning [Panait et al., 2006; Panait, Tuyls, Luke, 2008]

Replicator Dynamics [Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Smith, 1982; Schuster & Sigmund, 1983]

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Independent vs. Cooperative Agents

Modern and/or Deep RL Counterpart

Extensive-form Fictitious Play [Heinrich et al., 2015] Neural Fictitious Self-Play [Heinrich & Silver, 2016]

Multi-agent Deep Q-Networks [Tampuu et al., 2015]

Policy-Space Response Oracles [Lanctot et al., 2017]

Recurrent Hysteretic Q-Networks [Omidshafiei et al., 2017]

Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness [Foerster et al., 2017]

Lenient Deep Q-Networks [Palmer, Tuyls et al., 2018]

Neural Replicator Dynamics [Omidshafiei et al., 2019]



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± 2010

Deep RL Period

- Extension to Complex Worlds
 - Real-world settings
- Algorithmics at Scale
 Old & New ideas
- Equilibrium Learning
 - Nash & Correlated
 - mElo, α -Rank
- Training & Evaluation
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DeepMind

Era Illustrations

1. RD contributing to era's 1 and 2

2. AdA as a starting point for a (MA)RL foundation model in Era 3

Replicator Dynamics in Era 1 & 2



BNAIC 2002 / AAMAS 2003: fundamental Era

Session: Evolutionary Computation II 16:10-17:10 22 Tuesday

Chair: William B. Langdon

The session was the last (excluding prize giving and speeches) of two happy days in Leuven. Three papers were presented:

- 1. Karl Tuyls, Tom Lenaerts, Katja Verbeeck, Sam Maes and Bernard Manderick, Towards a Relation Between Learning Agents and Evolutionary Dynamics, p. 315-322.
- 2. Pieter Spronck, Ida Sprinkhuizen-Kuyper and Eric Postma, Improving Opponent Intelligence by Machine Learning, p. 299-306.
- 3. Robert E. Keller, Walter A. Kosters, Martijn van der Vaart and Martijn D. J. Witsenburg, Genetic Programming Produces Strategies for Agents in a Dynamic Environment. p. 171-178.

All three were original BNAIC papers



aamasos PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS Ary 14-18, 2003 Helpinson, Australia Jeffrey E. Rosens **Juoniais Sandhole Markasi Washinto** Bismids Widow ACRE I BIGART The International Foundation Suviente (IFMAS) The International Workship on Agent Theorie Architectures, and Languages (ATAL) in International Continuence on Arbie IN CACENTS! A selection-mutation model for q-learning in multi-agent systems

🔍 <u>Karl Tuyls, 😩 Katja Verbeeck, 😩 Tom Lenaerts</u>

pp 693-700 • https://doi.org/10.1145/860575.860687

Although well understood in the single-agent framework, the use of traditional reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms in multi-agent systems (MAS) is not always justified. The feedback an agent experiences in a MAS, is usually influenced by the other

BNAIC 2002 / AAMAS 2003: fundamental Era

$$\dot{x}_i = x_i \left(f(\boldsymbol{x})_i - \bar{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) \right)$$

 $\bar{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \sum_j x_j f(\boldsymbol{x})_j$

- Nash
- RD current policy
- RD time average
- SPG current policy
- SPG time average





Replicator Dynamics: key equation



"Perhaps a thing is simple if you can describe it fully in several different ways, without immediately knowing that you are describing the same thing" R. Feynman

Replicator Dynamics

- There are strong formal links between RD and MARL
 - Learning dynamics corresponds to replicator dynamics
 - Develop new algorithms

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FAQ} & \quad \frac{dx_i}{dt} = \frac{\alpha x_i}{\tau} [(Ay)_i - x^T Ay] + x_i \alpha \sum_j x_j ln(\frac{x_j}{x_i}) \\ \text{LFAQ} & \quad u_i = \sum_j \frac{A_{ij} y_j \left[\left(\sum_{k:A_{ik} \leq A_{ij}} y_k \right)^{\kappa} - \left(\sum_{k:A_{ik} < A_{ij}} y_k \right)^{\kappa} \right]}{\sum_{k:A_{ik} = A_{ij}} y_k} \\ & \quad \frac{dx_i}{dt} = \frac{\alpha x_i}{\tau} (u_i - x^T u) + x_i \alpha \sum_j x_j ln(\frac{x_j}{x_i}) \\ \text{FALA} & \quad \frac{dx_i}{dt} = \alpha x_i [(Ay)_i - x^T Ay] \\ \text{RM} & \quad \frac{dx_i}{dt} = \frac{\lambda x_i [(Ay)_i - x^T Ay]}{1 - \lambda [\max_k (Ay)_k - x^T Ay]} \end{aligned}$$



Neural Replicator Dynamics

A Unifying Perspective on Replicator Dynamics and Policy Gradient





RD in DeepRL era - Why Stratego?









Convergence to Nash equilibrium

Initial reward transform policy:

$$\pi^{1}_{0,reg}(H) = 0.999, \pi^{1}_{0,reg}(T) = 0.001$$

$$\pi^{2}_{0,reg}(H) = 0.999, \pi^{2}_{0,reg}(T) = 0.001$$

Scale parameter:

 $\eta = 0.2$

Stage 0:

Reward transform :

$$r_{\pi}^{i}(a) = r^{i}(a^{i}, a^{-i}) - \eta \log\left(\frac{\pi^{i}(a^{i})}{\pi_{0, reg}^{i}(a^{i})}\right) + \eta \log\left(\frac{\pi^{-i}(a^{-i})}{\pi_{0, reg}^{-i}(a^{-i})}\right)$$

Dynamics converges to : $\pi_{0, \text{fix}}$

<u>Update</u> : $\pi_{1,reg} \leftarrow \pi_{0,fix}$

Stage 1:

$\frac{\text{Reward transform}}{r_{\pi}^{i}(a) = r^{i}(a^{i}, a^{-i}) - \eta \log\left(\frac{\pi^{i}(a^{i})}{\pi_{0, reg}^{i}(a^{i})}\right) + \eta \log\left(\frac{\pi^{-i}(a^{-i})}{\pi_{0, reg}^{-i}(a^{-i})}\right)$

<u>Dynamics</u> converges to : $\pi_{1, \text{fix}}$ <u>Update</u> : $\pi_{2, reg} \leftarrow \pi_{1, fix}$





Scale the idea to Era 2





Evaluation on Bots and Humans

- 50 games played in April 2022
- DeepNash achieved 84% win rate
- Yielded 3rd rank in Classic Stratego Challenge Ranking 2022
- Yielded 3rd rank in All-Time Classic Stratego Ranking (since 2002)

Opponent	Number of Games	Wins	Draws	Losses
Probe	30	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Master of the Flag	30	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Demon of Ignorance	800	97.1%	1.8%	1.1%
Asmodeus	800	99.7%	0.0%	0.3%
Celsius	800	98.2%	0.0%	1.8%
Celsius1.1	800	97.9%	0.0%	2.1%
PeternLewis	800	99.9%	0.0%	0.1%
Vixen	800	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%



Material vs Information trade-off

- While Blue (DeepNash) is behind a 7 and 8
- none of its pieces are revealed and only two pieces moved.
- As a result DeepNash assesses its chance of winning to be still around 70%
- Blue indeed won this match.





Bluffing







Example match 1

Human opponent









Move 1121: BLUE's turn, value=0.620







'The level of play of DeepNash surprised me. I had never seen or heard of an artificial Stratego player that came close to the level needed to win a match against an experienced human player, but after playing against DeepNash myself I was not surprised by the top-3 ranking it later on achieved on the Gravon internet platform. I would expect this agent to also do very well if it participated in the World Championship'

- Vincent de Boer



Replicator Dynamics in the FM Era?

- 1. Equilibrate when foundation models meet/understanding implicit agent modelling
- 2. Develop new FM multiagent RL algorithms based on regularization.
- 3. Human in the loop and alignment.
- 4. RD for developing auto-curricula (e.g. see AdA)/gamify language, image generation



Navigating the landscape of multiplayer games

Shayegan Omidshafiei ⊠, Karl Tuyls, Wojciech M. Czarnecki, Francisco C. Santos, Mark Rowland, Jerome Connor, Daniel Hennes, Paul Muller, Julien Pérolat, Bart De Vylder, Audrunas Gruslys & Rémi Munos

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Adaptive Agent as a basis for a MA Foundation model



Foundation Models



Foundation models are typically characterised by:

• Rapid (few-shot) adaptation across a wide range of tasks.



Vision for an RL-based Foundation Model

Build agents capable of increasingly rapid, flexible and strategic adaptation on a usefully open-ended task space.



AdA has focused on looking for **Pareto improvement** in this part of the spectrum This results reel shows the learned behaviours of **a single agent**, AdA.

The following, hand-crafted tasks are used only to evaluate the agent. AdA has never seen them before, having been trained on a wide range of procedural tasks.

No training is happening during these videos. The agent is making decisions in real time based on its dynamic internal memory.



Remembering

Adaptation Challenges Experimentation, Irreversibility





AdA's goal is to hold a black cube, which does not exist among the initial objects.

There are two rules, which are hidden from AdA. It needs to identify the correct world state which triggers the first, helpful, rule and not the second one, which is a dead end.







AdA sees the world from this **first-person perspective** (RGB pixels).







Player Goal



Rules

Player Goal







Player Goal



Trial 1 / 3 Time Remaining: 7.73





Human-Timescale Adaptation in an Open-Ended Task Space

Results reel

Wrong Pair Disappears For Two





Adaptation Challenges Irreversibility, Division of Labour

Similar in nature to the singleagent 'Wrong pair disappears' task.

But in this multi-agent task variant, two agents share the same, cooperative, goal.

Both agents act independently and use the same trained AdA policy.



Human-Timescale Adaptation in an Open-Ended Task Space

Results reel

Large-scale RL² on a vast set of tasks





TL;DR conclusion

Motivation

Current RL agents **cannot learn** from exploration and feedback **on human timescales**

This is a **crucial skill** for human-facing systems, and a major factor in the success of current foundation models.

Results

Adaptive Agent (AdA) adapts to unknown environment dynamics in minutes.

AdA performs exploration, refinement and exploitation on the fly.

Methods

A vast 3D embodied task space.

Curriculum **co-adaptation** of agent and environment.

Large scale meta-RL with **Transformer** models.

Human-Timescale Adaptation in an Open-Ended Task Space

Adaptive Agent Team, Jakob Bauer, Kate Baumli, Satinder Baveja, Feryal Behbahani, Avishkar Bhoopchand, Nathalie Bradley-Schmieg, Michael Chang, Natalie Clay, Adrian Collister, Vibhavari Dasagi, Lucy Gonzalez, Karol Gregor, Edward Hughes, Sheleem Kashem, Maria Loks-Thompson, Hannah Openshaw, Jack Parker-Holder, Shreya Pathak, Nicolas Perez-Nieves, Nemanja Rakicevic, Tim Rocktäschel, Yannick Schroecker, Jakub Sygnowski, Karl Tuyls, Sarah York, Alexander Zacherl, Lei Zhang DeepMind

Conclusion

Concluding: work in era's coming together



- Challenging and exciting times ahead of us, with in parallel:
 - Fundamentals period
 - Deep-RL period
 - and Foundation Model period
 - *Fundamentals*: develop **equilibrium** and **alignment** concepts for FM

Deep-RL: improve algorithmics and autocurricula at scale

Foundation Models: development of MARL foundation agents with input from era 1 and 2



Concluding: RD as an example

• RD describing various MARL algorithms and serving as a basis for designing new algorithms

- We have achieved a human-expert level agent in Stratego with **model-free** RL/RD approach
 - Directly converges to Nash in imperfect information game
 - Generates unpredictable behavior

• F-MARL: RD for equilibration, alignment, auto curriculum



Concluding: two books

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Foundations and Modern Approaches

www.marl-book.com





Stefano V. Albrecht

Filippos Christianos



Lukas Schäfer

Updates at Sollow @UoE_Agents



Second (short) book in the works, complementary to the book above with P. Stone, G. Chalkiadakis and myself



DeepMind

Thanks!